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JEFFREY H. NILSEN Trade Credit and the Bank Lending Channel
The bank lending channel theory posits that during monetary contractions banks restrict some firms' loans, thus reducing their desired investment independently of interest rates. Previous research finds small firms reduce, while large firms accelerate, loan growth. We find that small firms increase trade credit, a substitute credit, indicating a strong loan demand. It supports the bank lending channel: they do not voluntarily cut bank loans since they increase a less-desirable alternative. Using trade credit is propitious since unlike commercial paper (investigated by previous researchers), it is widely used by the small firms suffering the loan decline. Surprisingly, we also find large firms increase trade credit, a puzzle since they are typically assumed to have wide access to other credit. Using individual manufacturing firm data, we find the reasons large firms use trade credit are financial in nature: those without a bond rating increase trade credit (that is, without access to open market credit). As relatively few firms have this mark of quality, it implies that more firms are affected by credit constraints than previously believed.
THE INFLUENCE OF CREDIT MARKET imperfections on the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy is still controversial [see surveys by Bernanke (1993) and Kashyap and Stein (1994) ]. Many economists believe that only the "money channel" is important, in particular, that the financial sector is irrelevant. This money channel view holds that when the central bank reduces reserves, higher costs of funds induce banks to reduce their demand deposits. If prices are sticky, this short-run decline in real money balances raises real interest rates to slow interest-sensitive spending and thus economic activity [see Mishkin's (1998) textbook summary of transmission channels].
"Credit channel" proponents believe that credit also plays an important part in the propagation of monetary shocks into the real economy (see, for example, Bernanke and Gertler 1995) . The "broad credit channel" view stresses that some firms are subject to an external finance premium, defined as the cost spread between a firm's external funds (bonds, loans, and equity) and its internal funds (retained earnings). According to this theory, higher risk during, for example, a recession sharpens information problems, thus increasing the affected firms' external finance premium and amplifying the policy-induced impact of market rates on firms. Firms lacking access to market credit are those prone to information problems and thus this "financial accelerator."
Proponents of the "bank lending channel," for example, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Kashyap and Stein (1994) , assert that banks' lending decisions also influence policy transmission, independently of the cost of capital. Accordingly, a reduction in reserves induces banks to scale back lending which disproportionately affects a class of firms that cannot readily switch to other funds, those without access to credit markets. Small firms, for instance, may be more dependent on banks than other firms, and without alternative financing, they may be forced to limit desired investment (or current production) for a given interest rate.
The bank lending channel is perhaps the most contentious transmission mechanism. Romer and Romer (1989) argue that loans do not play an important role since they find that a policy tightening initially impacts interest rates through deposits, not loans. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , though, find that policy shocks affect bank portfolios systematically, which money channel theories cannot explain.
1 Moreover, they find securities is the asset responsible for the immediate post-tightening decline in bank balance sheets and that real activity sags later, at about the same time as the reduction in lending. It is, however, difficult to disentangle whether firms are affected by the slow-down in activity and associated reduction in credit demand or from the loan supply reduction predicted by the bank lending channel. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) ingeniously solve this identification problem by showing that firms issue more commercial paper during monetary contractions. It suggests that firms are using more of a substitute credit because of a loan supply reduction and not that their loan demand is reduced by an activity slowdown. Unfortunately, commercial paper cannot inform about small firms since only large firms issue it (Oliner and Rudebusch 1996) . And Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that small and large firms exhibit distinctive behavior during tight monetary policy. Small firms suffer loan growth reductions while large firms actually accelerate loans from banks. Thus, the evidence to date still allows interpretation that small firms' bank loan reduction is due to lower demand arising from slower activity.
We make a simple test of the bank lending channel following Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox but with a substitute credit also available to the (manufacturing) firms suffering the loan decline. Trade credit (TC) is a loan a supplier provides to its customers in conjunction with product sales. TC is available to small firms yet its unattractiveness makes them reluctant to switch from loans to this substitute. But since TC is 2. One reason for believing large firms have exhausted their funds is provided by Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1992) who show large firms face rising unplanned inventories. Alternatively, large firms' TC rise because large customers may exploit monopsony power (Brechling and Lipsey 1963) . By being able to ignore small suppliers' TC terms, the large customer makes TC "cheap." We explore this case briefly in section 3 below.
3. We do not accept that the distribution of large suppliers to small customers is so predominant. Further, TC flows to and from the trade sectors (for example, small firms buy from wholesalers). This dissuades us from imposing more structure on AR, which we thus consider as simply another asset.
4. The Norrbin and Reffett (1995) cash-in-advance model and its "trade credit" is incongruent with the generally accepted concept of trade credit we utilize. First, in their model households issuing "trade credit" suffer positive transactions costs. Theories cited in the references and common sense, however, predict that the firms issuing it gain positive benefits. We also firmly believe that any attempt to empirically explain movements in long-term TC is misspecified that does not control for sales.
small firms' only alternative, its rise identifies the cause of slower loan growth as a restriction in supply. TC is then an excellent variable to test the bank lending channel theory because at times of tight monetary policy, it predicts small firms will increase TC and large firms, with assumed alternative credit sources, will avoid TC.
Using semiaggregated data, we find that small firms use greater amounts of TC during monetary contractions, supporting the bank lending channel. Surprisingly, though, we find that large firms' TC also increases, indeed to a greater extent than small firms.' This is puzzling indeed since large firms are often more established and thus less prone to the information problems that block small firms from open market credit or discourage banks from lending to them. Why is it then that large firms (with supposed untapped sources of funds) turn to an expensive substitute credit at times of tight monetary policy? 2 We split a sample of large manufacturing firms by criteria likely to influence their use of TC. Using firms' bond ratings, a direct indicator of credit market access first used by Whited (1992) , we find only nonrated firms increasing TC. Rated firms, on the other hand, use more loans. In other words, only those large firms with a recognized credit standing (and to which banks also prefer to lend) avoid TC. It suggests that the reason we observed large firms' rising TC in the earlier data set is that some large firms are also credit constrained. Largeness, per se, is after all only an imperfect indicator of credit quality. It suggests credit constraints involve a wider set of firms than is commonly assumed.
Previous research has studied TC within its relation to monetary policy. Jaffee (1971) and Duca (1986) find evidence to support Meltzer's (1960) redistribution hypothesis which posits that during tight money, more-liquid (large) suppliers pass funds via TC (their accounts receivable) to less-liquid (small) customers.
3 More recently, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) have found that TC does not rise during monetary contractions. Ramey (1992, p. 182) , however, describes other aggregate data, and observes "peaks in [TC] . . . occurred during credit crunches . . ." Norrbin and Reffett (1995) construct a cash-in-advance economy with a form of direct credit they call TC. 4 Yet this recent research neglects to control for TC's strong relationship with transactions (see discussion in part II).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 1, we examine more closely the motives for firms to utilize TC. We will emphasize the use of TC during monetary policy contractions. In section 2 we report results from the test strategy of examining small and large manufacturing firms in the United States. These firm types are frequently used as stereotypes corresponding to firms with and without access to financial markets. In section 3, we reexamine TC using a database which provides a better indicator of capital market access than the earlier data. Finally, we conclude in section 4.
WHY FIRMS USE TRADE CREDIT
Trade credit is a short-term loan a supplier provides to its customer upon a purchase of his product. Accounts payable (AP hereafter) is a significant part of U.S. manufacturing firms' balance sheets: its share in total liabilities is 13 percent (QFR 1990) . Importantly, small firms frequently use it: Cole and Wolken (1995) summarize the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances by noting TC's use by 61 percent of small businesses, "a rate that exceeded the use of all other financial services except checking." Davey's survey shows small firms like TC after bank loans as credit source (loans were noted by 90 percent, TC by 58 percent). In contrast, large firms preferred commercial paper (73 percent), loans (53 percent) and finally TC (31 percent).
Both the supplier and the customer take TC decisions around the product sale date, but at distinct times. The supplier decides whether to offer a customer TC at the time of the sales transaction. A critical influence is the history of his relationship with the customer. Then the customer decides, given that she is creditworthy and has purchased the good, to repay or delay when repayment is due. The first decision concerns the transactions motive of TC (which we call "transactions TC")-the supplier provides a credit service to the customer reducing her costs of using cash. The second decision involves the finance motive (which we call "finance TC"), the idea that firms with few alternative funds sources are more likely to delay repayment to suppliers when they lack funds. We thus note TC's transformation from a substitute payment medium (a preferred substitute for cash) to a substitute finance medium (an unattractive substitute for loans). TC's substitution as cash is short-lived since of course the customer repays using, for example, demand deposits.
In the following parts we first describe the firms' choice of TC at the time of the sales decision, transactions TC. Then we review TC at the time of repayment, finance TC. We find AP/sales to be a very useful indicator of finance TC (we argue below it is unaffected by the transactions motive) and thus credit constraints. Finally, part 1C summarizes the behavioral influences on AP/sales at times of monetary contractions, when firms are most likely to face binding credit constraints, and describes our test of the bank lending channel theory.
1A. Transactions Motive
The transactions motive is the basis for a direct relation between TC and the amount of a firm's transactions: each purchase utilizing TC provides a cost savings to a customer. We expect this motive to explain a major part of the level of AP, and 5. The figure shows large and small firms' AP/sales converging, probably due to data construction (small firms migrate to larger categories over time due to the nominal asset criterion of QFR data). See Figure A1 to compare large firms'AP/sales across the two data sources used in this research. The working paper version of Appendix II discusses this comparison in greater detail. We are confident detrending extracts valid business cycle information, but are very uncomfortable in using the data for long-term analysis (for example, cointegration).
6. It is related to Nadiri's (1969) neoclassical model that posits a firm maximizing sales revenue using TC (like advertising). The model highlights AR's beauty as a sales-repayment incentive: a discount induces purchase and high implicit rates remind customers about timely repayment.
7. Ferris' transactions motive also posits that firms increase TC with higher interest rates, but given sales. Sales fall with tight money, and then the model predicts TC only ambiguously.
8. Finance TC implies credit market imperfections, since perfect markets would allow the firms to obtain lower-cost funds. Transactions TC does not require imperfections since firms rationally cut costs; for example, firms with payment fluctuations save via TC versus separate overdraft facilities.
importantly whenever sales fall, it predicts that AP falls. Figure 1 5 confirms an almost proportional relationship between sales and TC: large manufacturing firms' AP to sales ratios range between 19 -28 percent, while small firms' ratio fluctuates within an even narrower band of 23-29 percent for the thirty-two years shown on the graph.
Several theories investigate this motive for firms' use of TC. Schwartz (1974) explains that the customer benefits since TC simplifies cash management. In a world of, for example, uncertain deliveries, TC, as a separation between the exchanges of cash and goods, smoothes the uncertainty of a customer's future cash outlays. In Ferris ' (1981) model, the customer passes on some part of TC's cost savings to its supplier-partner as they jointly coordinate uncertainly timed payments. Transactions TC thus allows firms to reduce their precautionary cash and instead hold interest-earning assets. The TC offer reflects the transactions motive as each sale dollar permits the customer to cut costs associated with delayed cash use.
6
Relationships are likely to be more important in TC decisions than in bank lending decisions (for example, Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995) . Supplier-customer relationships play a great role in offering TC since credit provision is not the supplier's specialty. The supplier offers TC to its customers based on levels of trust: whether she is an existing credit, existing noncredit, or new customer. He expects the invoice will be paid and often offers a discount making early repayment more attractive (see discussion in part 1B below).
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1B. Finance Motive
8
The Sovereign can leave bills unpaid-for a time-although high rates of interest quickly find their way into prices paid by the royal household. (Kindleberger 1993, p.157) Customers sensibly like transactions TC: it lets them purchase inputs without putting cash "up front." But using TC for finance is a highly unattractive substitute relative to bank loans. First, it is tied to the purchase of goods, while loans may be unrestricted. Further, the supplier requires TC repayment typically within thirty days, while loans are usually longer term. Finally, the customer's TC provider is its supplier, not a finance specialist, so she faces significant late payment penalties in- 11. Will a customer suffering liquidity problems repay TC already on her balance sheet? She faces strong repayment pressure, but also lacks funds to implement repayment. The supplier has no active role in the customer's "credit extension" decision.
cluding implicit costs of damaging a critical long-term relationship as well as significant pecuniary penalties (Petersen and Rajan 1994) . Figure 2 shows the timing distinction between transactions and finance TC.
One indicator of finance TC's unattractiveness is the lost earnings when customers ignore the early repayment discount. The most common payment plan is "2/10, net 30" (Ng, Smith, and Smith 1999) , by which a customer takes a 2 percent discount on the purchase price if she repays within ten days; otherwise she repays in full within thirty days. 9 The customer granted TC thus faces a simple financial decision at the discount date (the ten-day deadline). She delays the 98 percent list payment if the returns from investing it exceed the extra 2 percent to be repaid in twenty days (this translates to an over 40 percent annual rate).
10 The customer's incentive to repay then is obviously strong since very few alternative instruments offer such a high yield. Petersen and Rajan (1994) , for example, estimate TC's cost in a cross section of small firms and find it more expensive than 99.8 percent of the loans in the sample.
The finance motive focuses on the customer as initiator of the postpurchase "credit extension." A lack of funds can compel the customer to delay repayment and so ignore the very attractive implicit rates offered by the supplier's discount. While TC is an unattractive substitute for loans, it lies "readily at hand," credit a customer conveniently invokes if facing reduced bank credit. She merely delays repayment, lengthening TC duration, and thus "extending" credit to herself.
11
We control for the transactions motive by using AP/sales since we expect a sales reduction at the onset of tight money to induce a reduction in AP. Table 1 reasons that AP/sales is not systematically affected by any likely TC offer policy, that is, the ratio is robust to the transactions motive. Considering also Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999) , 12. If a current credit customer wants to buy during tight money, the supplier will almost surely extend TC to retain his customer base at a critical time in the cycle. If the supplier holds inventories and sees slower sales, he faces illiquidity in either choice of holding inventories or AR.
who conclude in a survey of nearly one thousand suppliers that "We find little willingness to vary [TC] terms either in lieu of product price changes or in response to a change in prevailing interest rates . . . trade credit terms are stable over time," the table strongly supports the supplier's passivity to the business cycle: once he decides to extend TC to a particular customer, it becomes policy.
12
Previous empirical evidence on the finance motive is mixed. Brechling and Lipsey (1963) and Coates (1967) , using different samples of British manufacturing firms, find conflicting evidence for the existence of the finance motive. Petersen and Rajan (1995) examine TC in a cross-section study of bank-firm relations. They find, after controlling for age, incorporation status, profits, and bank relationships, that the value of firms' book assets positively and significantly influence the percentage of TC discounts taken. This supports that small firms are less able to exploit TC discounts due to fewer alternative credit sources. And it suggests that we try to link delayed repayment TC use to credit constrained firms in times of duress.
1C. TC during Monetary Contractions
Our measure of finance TC, AP/sales, is robust to the business cycle. The only change a supplier may make in response to tight monetary policy (reexamine Table  1 ) is to restrict new offers of TC to current noncredit customers (as above, we assume suppliers never offer TC to new customers). The corresponding change in Table 1 is to remove the fourth column's influence, and this induces AP/sales to fall thus biasing against observing TC's finance motive.
Firms should ordinarily avoid the unattractive finance TC as loan substitute. If banks restrict credit, though, those firms dependent on banks may be forced to use finance TC, while those having alternative credit may ignore it. Since the supplier's terms of TC remain constant over time, it can become relatively cheaper than loans, especially during tight money: a customer will switch to finance TC when the loan The table shows how a supplier's "offer TC" decision at the sale date impacts his customer and the effect on AP/Sales during "normal" times, that is, non-tight money periods. We assume a customer prefers TC to cash and always purchases if offered TC. We also assume to "not offer TC" to a current credit customer discourages her, unimportant if the supplier's terms remain constant (see Ng, Smith, and Smith 1999) . Finally, we assume a relationship is built using non-credit sales; the supplier never offers a new customer TC without her first buying with cash. Other columns are self-explanatory. For example, in the third column the supplier does not offer TC to a current noncredit customer, who is not discouraged since she views it as policy. The supplier's average credit sales and thus AP/sales remain the same.
13. An asset criterion assumes book assets are positively correlated with tangible assets. Banks prefer lending to firms with greater tangible assets (for a given level of sales) due to greater collateral. price (including the influence of quantity constraints) rises above TC's total cost. AP/sales, our measure of finance TC, then indicates binding credit constraints, especially useful since published loan rates so poorly represent a market-clearing price.
Finance TC provides us with a clear test of the bank lending channel. A Fed policy contraction cuts reserves. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that small firms' loans decelerate while large firms' loans accelerate. The bank lending channel predicts that it is loan supply causing a decline in small firms' loans, not a demand response of lower real activity. Using the logic of Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox we conclude that if small firms increase AP/sales, our measure of finance TC, it supports a supply rationale and the bank lending channel. For if there were no bank lending channel, then some firms are inexplicably switching (at least according to the "money channel" view) into a unattractive substitute for bank loans. Finance TC is a more appropriate instrument for this test than commercial paper since, as Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) note, the rise in commercial paper cannot inform about the small firms which do not issue it.
EVIDENCE FROM THE QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORTS (QFR)
The QFR data clearly show a strong use of transactions TC by manufacturing firms (Figure 1 ). We will show in this part that in tight money episodes, both small and large firms use Finance TC, despite its disadvantages. This behavior is consistent with firms' inability to access other credit. And importantly it indicates a strong credit demand and suggests that supply is responsible for the small firms' decline in loan growth, thus supporting the bank lending channel. We will focus on the anomalous large firm behavior in part 3 below.
2A. Description of the QFR Data
We classify firms by asset size following Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) , among others, based on the idea that young, relatively unknown firms and those having low collateral are also likely to be small. 13 These firms are likely prone to information problems, and so require intermediaries due to the high information requirements of open market debt.
We use several indicators of the stance of monetary policy. We find "Romer dates" very suitable for illustrative purposes. Romer and Romer (1989) examine Federal Open Market Committee meeting notes to identify deliberate policy-initiated disinflations. "Romer" dates' exogeneity is not uncontroversial, but they conveniently indicate tight policy; our results are robust to other policy indicators. In regressions we follow Laurent (1988) and many others to utilize measures based on the Fed funds rate. In the impulse response functions reported below, we use the term spread, the 14 . Surprisingly, the data show that large-firms' loans and cash are very volatile and less synchronized with sales than small-firms'. The detrended large-firm loans and cash series' correlation with sales are .03 and .08 compared with small-firms' .69 and .34, respectively.
15. Using sales to proxy transactions is not perfectly satisfactory since AP are more directly associated with a firm's purchases. We verify that AP/sales behaves like AP/production in both data sets used in this research. See the working paper version for more detail.
16. We also compare firms using forecast errors at times of tight money to infer the impact of an unexpected monetary policy action. Results are consistent with those reported here. difference between ten-year bond rates and the Fed funds rate. Results were not materially influenced using other indicators, for example, monetary aggregates.
A problem with implementing this small-large distinction is that few data sources include small firms. We follow Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) to use QFR, published by the Census Bureau and based on Internal Revenue Service corporate tax returns. This set aggregates firm data according to eight nominal asset sizes in the range of assets (in millions of dollars): below $5, $5-10, $10-25, $25-50, $50-100, $100-250, $250-1,000, and over $1,000. The QFR provides income statements and balance sheets for all large firms and a sample of small firms (only those with assets over $250,000 are presently sampled).
As Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) note, the QFR categorization of firms in nominally valued asset sizes, unaltered since 1959, makes it difficult to apply time series methods (see footnote 5). We follow their method (Appendix 1 gives details) and classify firms as small in a given period if they are members of the asset groups accounting for the lowest 30 percent of the total sales distribution. As so formed, the small firm category includes firms with the following asset groups (in millions of dollars) : under $25 until 1967, $50 until 1971, $100 until 1976, $500 until 1989 , and finally $1,000 until 1992. The method described in the appendix avoids discontinuities when the groupings change. We are also confident the resulting firm classifications yield distinct types of firms. For example, the variance of large firms' cash and loans (in growth rates) are almost three times greater than small firms'.
14 We make adjustments for definition changes in the QFR data (see again the appendix). We convert nominal data into real using the wholesale price index (except GDP: the implicit price deflator). The series are deseasonalized by subtracting the mean deviation of each respective season, calculated after detrending the series with a five-quarter weighted moving average.
2B. First QFR Evidence
We use AP/sales to indicate finance TC. Ideally, input purchases should be used to control for the transactions motive, but this variable is unavailable in QFR. 15 The top graph in Figure 1 shows that TC is at times disproportional to sales, often corresponding to monetary policy contractions as indicated by the vertical lines on Romer dates. Also note that both types of firms act similarly and indeed it is difficult to discern differences between them in the most recent periods.
To focus on finance TC during tight monetary policy times, we compare the behavior of AP/sales at Romer dates to other times. 16 We check the variance of the entire series of residuals from a detrending regression and of tight and easy money 17. Results were robust to tight money periods defined as twelve or sixteen quarters after Romer dates. 18. We define an episode to consist of the detrended series of interest (in log differences) four quarters before and twelve quarters after each Romer date. We average growth for each period of the episode and then cumulate to obtain levels. We ignore late-fourth-episode periods to avoid double counting (this Romer date is the 1979-1981 recession-recovery-recession). Finally we normalize to zero by subtracting the initial average period's level from each other average period's level.
subperiods. 17 The means of the AP/sales residuals are positive in tight money and negative at other times. Moreover, the variance of both series are more than twice as large during tight money (Table 2) , statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Figure 3 illustrates average changes in finance TC over the six Romer dates in the sample. 18 The AP/sales ratio increase shows that small firms are slow to repay their TC. Small firms seem here slightly more influenced by finance TC than large firms.
For additional insight on whether firms are credit constrained, we consider cash, the most liquid asset (this includes their government securities holdings in QFR). For a given amount of sales, a low cash level indicates firms' inability to repay their suppliers. The bottom graph in Figure 3 shows that small and large firms behave distinctively following Romer dates. Both face a steep fall in cash prior to the Romer date, but small firms rebuild their balances quickly, while large firms' balances continue to fall for the next six quarters. It supports small firms' flexibility: although credit constrained, they quickly make necessary adjustments to survive the bad times. Large firms, with a greater financial load due to inventories are much worse off for a longer period.
To sum up this first pass at evidence, TC declines as predicted by the transactions motive following the onset of tight money. We find, however, that firms generally increase finance TC. Interestingly, large firms increase TC/sales earlier than small firms after monetary policy shocks.
2C. VAR Analyses
We next use unrestricted VARs following Sims (1980) and many others. This method has become standard and is informative since it imposes a standard set of 
FIG. 3. Average Romer Episode
19. A nine-variable system (consisting of macro variables and each firms' sales, AP/cash, and loans; see Figure 6 ) verifies that partial systems do not ignore important interactions. It replicates Gertler and Gilchrist (small-firms' deeper fall in sales while large-firms' (not small-firms') loans rise), but it also shows large-firms' stronger AP/cash rise consistent with small-firms' flexibility bringing quick recovery while large-firms' rigidity inducing longer illiquidity. restrictions to achieve identification. There remain, however, issues concerning arbitrariness in variable ordering and the relative imprecision of impulse response functions. We tried many different orderings of the variables and found they brought essentially identical results. For stationarity, all nonratio, non-interest rate variables are put into log-differenced form. An improved characterization of the data is obtained by detrending with log, constant, and quadratic terms. Finally, the imprecision of the impulse response functions are made explicit by including onestandard-deviation error bounds, calculated in an algorithm based on asymptotic theory by Lütkepohl (1993) .
We first set up two systems, one for small firms and one for large. 19 The macro variables GDP, price level, and the monetary policy indicator (specifically, the spread between the Fed funds and long-term Treasury bond rates) are included in each system. We tried monetary aggregates (for example, M2), but believe they contain too much bank behavior to indicate central bank policy (M2 shocks tended to elicit slightly stronger reactions in the TC series than with interest rate-based indicators).
The small firm system consists of the macro variables along with inventory/sales, cash/sales and AP/sales [equation (1)]. The idea is to trace the sequence of events within firms occurring after a monetary policy shock as indicated by a higher rate spread. We include the inventory to sales ratio to exploit information it gives on the higher funding load on large firms. We include the cash to sales ratio to exploit information on the firms' differing relative liquidity positions.
(1) where X t is a vector of the right-hand-side variables.
The macro variables have strong influence on small firms in variance decompositions and Granger causality tests. But the important relationships between small-firm variables observed in the earlier descriptive evidence are now given statistical significance in the impulse response function (Figure 4) . The AP/sales ratio rises significantly soon after the shock, although the reaction quickly dissipates. In the first four quarters of the episode, we see that AP/sales rise prior to the sharp rise in inventory/sales. Cash/sales drops lower throughout the first four quarters (again indicating that small firms find themselves at the end of their liquid reserves). The working paper version of this paper provides an appendix which compares the two data sources. We are confident that the cyclical behavior of large firms in both data sets is identical.
21. We include these firms in aggregate studies since the merger is likely to have occurred within the manufacturing sector. We would include merged firms in the separate industry analyses if the merger involved firms in the same industry, but this information is not available.
In the large-firm system, a similar pattern arises in the impulse response function ( Figure 5 ). AP/sales increases sooner, but at a more gradual pace than the small firms. The large-firms' inventory to sales ratio rises about twice as much as in the small-firm system. Large firms deviate most from small firms in suffering a much lower cash to sales ratio, which continues significantly for twelve quarters after the shock. It suggests that small firms are more flexible in recovering from the constraints quickly.
Summing up the QFR evidence, we find it consistent with firms' having a strong demand for credit, at least in the early stages of tight money episodes. Small firms' increase in AP/sales is as predicted by the bank lending channel. The increase by large firms' AP/sales is surprising. We suspect it to be related, though, to their higher inventory to sales ratios. Further support is given by small firms' short drop in cash while large firms suffer with lower money balances for a full three years following the monetary shock. This seems to indicate that large firms also suffer from constraints, and indeed, for a longer time than do small firms. The purpose of the next section is to examine large firms' characteristics to determine whether this is indeed the case.
EVIDENCE FROM COMPUSTAT: TC AND LARGE FIRMS
The QFR provides surprising evidence that even large firms use greater amounts of TC relative to sales at times of tight money. Why should firms generally accepted as less prone to information problems and thus perceived as less risky by banks resort to less attractive credit? Do funding problems also reach those firms? Or do large firms use market power to "extend" TC credit from their suppliers at low perceived cost? To answer this issue we seek characteristics of large firms associated with the behavior and so we turn from QFR semiaggregated to Compustat individual firm data. 20 We construct an unbalanced panel of manufacturing firms and include failing firms since we believe they provide important information about business cycle effects. The July 1993 version of Compustat provides annual data until 1992 for all firms listed on an organized exchange in the United States. We include in the study all manufacturing firms in any Compustat file with over $250 million in assets (in 1983 dollars), having nonzero, nonmissing data for the relevant variables. Firms involved in major merger or acquisition activity are discarded from analysis of either individual firms or industries. 21 We also discard observations associated with highly improbable values, for instance, an observation associated with negative sales or lia- (that is, 1979-1982) versus other times is indicated by the distance in Figure 7 from the observation to the zero axis.
23. We discount the oil industry, number 29, since oil-related behavior reflected other factors. Yergin (1991) reports the Iran-Iraq war led to great uncertainty in oil firms' supply. "The rush to build inventories by oil companies, reinforced by consumers, resulted in an additional 3 million barrels per day of 'demand' above actual consumption . . . In sum, the panic buying to build inventories more than doubled the actual shortage and further fueled the panic." 24. We tested results omitting oil firms: the results are robust. 25. Since the "cash-poor" firms have greater property, plant, and equipment than the "cash-rich" firms, we expect that cash-poor firms would also use TC rather than liquidating fixed assets. We are thus still puzzled by finding that cash-rich firms (save fewer transactions costs using TC rather than liquidating) use more TC than the cash-poor firms.
26. Opler et al. (1999) calculate quartiles of Compustat firms' cash/assets at each point in time. This is sensible if one is examining how cash/assets change over time. We are interested in the long-term determinants of firms' cash/assets behavior and its influence on TC use over the business cycle. This is why we calculate the percentiles of firms' average cash/assets over time. Results were robust to other cutoffs, for example, twentieth and eightieth percentiles. bilities greater than assets. Nonratio variables examined in a time dimension are deflated by the CPI obtained from Citibase.
3A. Descriptive Evidence from Compustat
We now investigate characteristics that might influence firms' finance TC in tight money. Figure 7 , 22 illustrating nontrivial industries during the severe 1979-1982 recession, reveals that firms in different industries display similar AP/sales: a clear positive reaction in 1979, a more muted one in 1980, and increasingly negative responses as the recession becomes entrenched. This is consistent with the view that credit constraints bind in the early recession phase (Eckstein and Sinai 1986) . 23 We next take a graphical approach to investigate important firm characteristics that may be associated with TC use (see associated regression results in part 3B). As first suggested by Whited (1992) , a bond rating proxies that a firm has access to relatively inexpensive external finance. Figure 8 shows that a bond rating is clearly an important determinant in large firms' use of TC (the bottom left graph shows rated and non-rated firms' detrended AP/sales averaged over the three Romer dates). The firms without this bond rating used TC with greater intensity during periods of tight money.
24
Does the amount of cash on hand, controlling for assets, influence the use of TC? If a firm views TC as unattractive credit, its TC/sales ratio should fall if it holds a large amount of cash, for the firm possesses the liquidity to repay its suppliers. 25 We assign firms into groups according to whether their mean (over time) cash over assets is below the thirtieth or above the seventieth percentile of firms in the sample. 26 We then aggregate the extreme groups' AP and sales and detrend the AP/sales ratio. We interpret differences in the groups' AP/sales at times of monetary tightness as related to their cash/assets ratio. Surprisingly, we find cash-rich firms used TC to a greater extent than cash-poor firms (Figure 9 , left side). This behavior is inconsistent with our thesis, but other explanations are possible. For example, it may be that cash-rich firms must hold compensating balances or that their transactions cost savings are especially high in using TC (cash-poor firms' property, plant and equipment were 1977, 1978, and 1979 (the latter two having especially tight money conditions) revealed no significant relation between cash/assets and TC/sales. Eliminating firms with bond ratings makes AP/sales much more similar between the thirtieth and seventieth percentile groups, implying again that access to bond markets influenced the higher AP/sales by cash-rich firms in the full-sample graphs. much greater than cash-rich firms'). 27 We will revisit this issue in part 3B below. When we eliminate from the sample those (few) very large firms (with over $50 billion in assets), cash-rich firms used even more TC/sales at tight money times (see the right diagrams on Figure 9 ). It supports that monopoly power does not importantly explain firms' use of TC/sales, since we associate extreme size with monopoly power.
The asymmetric-information literature suggests that fast-growing firms may be especially sensitive to credit conditions. If these firms stretch their resources to the limit in the course of achieving rapid growth, they may be more sensitive to monetary shocks. For example, when they are buffeted by a demand shock, they do not have as large a safety margin as other firms and thus may use TC to a greater extent. We follow a similar procedure to that described in the above paragraph, but find little evidence to support this hypothesis; see the lower-right graph on Figure 8 . It shows that both slow-and fast-growth large firms have similar behavior concerning TC/sales.
3B. Simple Time Series Models
We use a simple model that shows unexpected demand innovations may induce unanticipated build-ups in firms' inventories: a fall in demand reduces sales while production continues. An increase in credit demand arises from the loss of liquidity . We obtain, though, similar results using firms' finished goods inventories. 29. Our constructed purchase variable, defined as the cost of goods sold plus the change in inventories, is obviously unsuited for this regression. We thus proxy purchases with sales. and cost of holding inventories. In the model, the firm has a target level of inventories since it is costly to turn away customers (due to stock-outs), yet it is also costly to hold inventories. We assume this target is constant over time for simplicity. Since it is also costly to alter production, whether for increases (due to, for example, overtime) or for decreases (due to, for example, severance payments), the firm cannot adjust immediately to a new equilibrium. Using a partial adjustment equation (see, for example, Harvey 1981)
where FGI is finished goods inventories. Deviations from expected sales comprise white noise innovations:
The firm finances inventory shocks with STC, short-term credit (for example, bank loans), partly rolled over:
or TC which has a transactions component (where Pch are the firm's purchases):
We log and detrend aggregate series of 121 rated and 117 nonrated firms for each year 1973-1992. The inventory shocks are residuals from an AR-1 process, equation (3). We utilize total inventories since this series has by far fewer missing observations in the Compustat data than the more theoretically appealing series finished goods inventories. 28 We regress equations (5) and (6) separately on the rated and nonrated firms using ordinary least squares and report results in the first column on the right and left side of Table 3. 29 Note first that rated firms' credit has a long-lasting component unlike nonrated firms' (α R Ͼ α NR ). This may indicate that banks are less likely to interrupt rated firms' credit relative to non-rated firms, consistent with a flight to quality (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist) . Note also a reaffirmation of a strong transactions motive of TC (see the δ coefficients). The AP and sales relation is stronger (although measured less accurately) in the rated firms (δ R Ͼ δ NR ). It is consistent with rated firms obtaining a greater share of their purchases on credit from their suppliers. The difference between the rated and nonrated firms is, however, not statistically significant. More interesting is the reaction to an inventory shock: rated firms' loans rise by a greater extent than nonrated firms (β R Ͼ β NR ), while nonrated 30. The correlation of firms that are cash rich (above the seventieth percentile of cash holdings) and having a bond rating in each year is approximately Ϫ.20. The correlation of cash-poor firms and the bond rating is approximately .05 in each year. firms increase TC more, (γ NR Ͼ γ R ). The difference in TC use by rated and nonrated firms is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This supports the logic of part 1B: nonrated firms, like the prototypical small firm, lack alternative funds and are thus forced to use finance TC to fund unexpected shocks.
As both rated and nonrated firms are affected by similar macroeconomic influences, indicated by correlated regression residuals, we report results using the seemingly unrelated regression technique (SUR) in the subsequent columns of Table 3 . This technique does indeed reduce the standard errors of the estimates in most cases. For example, it brings the t-statistics on the nonrated firms' long-lasting loan component to significance (α NR Ͼ 0). A further specification (again using the SUR technique) was based roughly on the AP/sales variable used on the QFR data. The third columns of Table 3 show the results of regressing the inventory shocks on AP/sales and short-term loans. The coefficient estimates are roughly similar to the earlier two columns.
We next readdress the puzzling graphical evidence that cash-rich firms use more TC than cash-poor firms. The regression results in Table 4 reaffirm that cash-rich firms fund inventory shocks with TC, while cash-poor firms do not. The typical cashrich firms do not have a bond rating, 30 so the lack of market access to funds may explain their high cash holdings: as precaution. This is supported by Opler et al. (1999) , whose study gives characteristics of cash-rich corporations. Specifically, Opler et al. find cash-rich firms have lower cash flows, are "substantially smaller," and are in industries with highly volatile cash flows. We expect such characteristics may make firms more likely to use finance TC. However, the significant positive co-JEFFREY H. NILSEN : 247 31. An exception is the book-asset-rich firms. It is interesting to note the similarity between bookasset-rich rated firms and cash-rich rated firms: the coefficients are larger than expected. Does this indicate a class of firms that are given primacy in all forms of credit? efficient of cash-rich firms that have a bond rating remains puzzling: we would think these firms would rather use their alternative funds sources than TC.
The collateral banks require from firms for loans is often based on the amount of fixed assets on the firms' books. Firms with little collateral are less able to get loans. We split the firms in the sample using a similar procedure to the above: we categorize firms as fixed asset rich if they are above the seventieth percentile of firms as measured by the book value of their property, plant and equipment relative to total assets. Table 5 shows that those firms with the greatest book assets do indeed use less TC than the other firms. Further, in each category of relative book asset size, those firms without a bond rating use more TC than those with a bond rating (differences in the coefficients are not significant in this case). 31 This again supports that firms facing liquidity problems and without funding alternatives turn more to finance TC than others.
CONCLUSION
The bank lending channel posits that during a contractionary monetary policy episode, a reduction in loans forces bank-dependent firms to cut spending independently of changes in the cost of capital. We show that small firms, unlikely to have alternative finance sources, increase their use of an unattractive alternative to bank loans. It identifies the cause of their loan reduction as a supply phenomenon, supporting the bank lending channel theory. Surprisingly, large firms also increase their finance trade credit, an anomaly since they are generally assumed to access cheaper credit, for example, commercial paper. However, we find in Compustat data that firms without bond ratings, those that are cash rich (with, for example, volatile cash flows), and those lacking collateralizable assets use trade credit similarly to the small firms in the earlier data set. Large firms with a bond rating, that is, those with alternatives, do not use trade credit finance. This explains the puzzle in the earlier largesmall firm data: those large firms responsible for the increase in trade credit do not have alternatives: they lack a bond rating. This evidence reinforces that firms use TC for financial reasons at these times. Firms without attractive alternatives are turning to costly last resort credit because banks have cut off their loans, again what the bank lending channel leads us to expect. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that "small firms account for a significant share of the decline in manufacturing that follows a shift to tight money." Many others have attempted to quantify the effect of constraints by using small firms. This paper shows that in order to gauge the full effect of credit constraints, one should not only measure the impact on small firms, but also on those large firms that do not have a bond rating. Furthermore, to the extent that large firms are preferred bank customers, that these large firms are also turning to unattractive TC implies that they are constrained in their use of bank loans. Thus, credit constraints are more widespread than previously believed.
APPENDIX I: QFR AND DEFINITION OF LARGE AND SMALL FIRMS Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) define small manufacturing firms as consisting of the lowest thirtieth percentile of the total manufacturing sales distribution. We follow JEFFREY H. NILSEN : 249 this method, which takes the eight size classes provided by the QFR and estimates growth rates for a cumulation called large firms and one called small firms. More specifically, the cell that contains the thirtieth percentile of nominal sales is considered the "marginal size class" for that period. This will be the cut-off point that determines for the other variables the size of small and large firms. That is, a weight to be applied to the other variables is then calculated. Very simply, the growth rate of small firms will be a weighted average of the classes up to the marginal size class and that up to and including the marginal size class. At this point the other variables are cumulated up from the smallest class to the largest. The growth rate of these partially accumulated cells are then calculated using the sales-based weights.
1. Determine the marginal size class with respect to sales. We cumulate each successively larger class until 30 percent of total sales is attained. This group includes the marginal size class and defines the upper bound of small firms. 2. This simultaneously determines the lower bound group: all classes of small firms up to but not including the marginal size class. 3. We now determine sales-based weights to apply to the other series we study, for example, AP. The weights formula is given by Gertler and Gilchrist: the firms with sales below the third class account for x, such that x Ͻ 30 percent, and the fourth class accounts for y, such that y Ͼ 30 percent. Then the weight to apply is w ϭ (y Ϫ 30) / (y Ϫ x). And the growth rate for the small firm series is w * g ϩ (1 Ϫ w) * s, where g is the growth rate associated with the group having x and s is the growth rate of the group having y. (The idea is that we apply the sales-determined weights to find the growth of the marginal size class to allocate to the lower-and upper-bound groups). 4. Get the initial value for small and large firms. 5. Cumulate up to achieve levels series. 6. Log transform, and detrend by using residuals from a regression of each series on a constant, linear, quadratic, and log terms.
APPENDIX II: DIFFERENCES IN CYCLICAL CHARACTERISTICS QFR VERSUS COMPUSTAT
The series in Compustat display greater cyclicality than the corresponding series in the QFR (see Figure A1 ). The source of this volatility is not due to combinations, since dropping firms involved in mergers and acquisitions brought even greater cyclicality. Nor does the volatility arise from applying a strict nominal cutoff of $250 million in assets. This could occur if many firms rise above $250 million in assets during good times (and so are included in the sample) and drop below $250 million during bad times (so they are dropped from the sample). We used alternate selection criteria, for example, included any firm which hit $250 million at any time during the study, or included firms with assets averaging over $250 million, and the cyclicality did not change to a perceptible degree. Neither is Compustat's greater international coverage the cause. Since nations' business cycles are not perfectly correlated, we expect that a data set including international entities would display less cyclicality.
The good news is that the volatility difference between the Compustat and QFR series washes out in ratio form. The graphs of Figure A1 display three ratios in Compustat and the QFR with detrended versions immediately beneath them. The bottomcenter graph, AP/inventories, is especially similar between the data sets. Finally, no data set is dominantly cyclical. In fact, the QFR series AP/inventory is more volatile than the corresponding ratio from Compustat (the QFR's standard deviation is .045 vs. .036 for Compustat).
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